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  355	  
THE	  LAW,	  GENDERED	  ABUSE,	  AND	  THE	  LIMITS	  AND	  
POSSIBILITIES	  OF	  FEMINIST	  THEORY	  
Lisa	  D.	  Brush	  *	  
LEIGH	   GOODMARK,	   A	   TROUBLED	   MARRIAGE:	   DOMESTIC	   VIOLENCE	   AND	   THE	   LEGAL	  SYSTEM	  (2011).	  Pp.	  263.	  Hardcover	  $65.00.	  	  The	   year	   2013	  marked	   the	   thirtieth	   anniversary	   of	   the	   publication	   of	   Cath-­‐arine	  MacKinnon’s	  Feminism,	  Marxism,	  Method,	  and	   the	  State:	  Toward	  Feminist	   Ju-­‐
risprudence.1	  Although	  she	  does	  not	  cite	   this	  essay	   in	  particular,	  Leigh	  Goodmark2	  refers	  to	  MacKinnon	  as	  a	  founding	  theorist	  of	  dominance	  feminism.3	  As	  Goodmark	  recounts	  the	  history	  of	  feminist	  legal	  theory	  and	  activism	  in	  A	  Troubled	  Marriage,4	  dominance	   feminism	   provided	   the	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	   what	   became	   the	  United	  States	  legal	  system’s	  response	  to	  women	  subjected	  to	  what	  Goodmark	  calls	  domestic	  violence.5	  Goodmark	  contends	  that	  this	  theoretical	  foundation	  was	  grave-­‐ly	  flawed	  (she	  uses	  the	  past	  tense	  rather	  than	  the	  anthropological	  present	  when	  she	  refers	  to	  the	  history	  of	  a	  theory	  whose	  time	  Goodmark	  thinks	  has	  passed—and	  not	  a	  moment	  too	  soon).6	  “Convinced	  that	  the	  state	  should	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  wom-­‐
                                                            	   *	   Professor	  of	  Sociology,	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh.	  Thanks	  to	  my	  rapid	  response	  team:	  Amy	  Elman	  and	  Claire	  Renzetti.	  Remaining	  errors	  and	  failures	  of	  grace	  or	  nerve	  are	  mine	  alone.	  	   1.	  	   Catharine	   A.	   MacKinnon,	   Feminism,	   Marxism,	   Method,	   and	   the	   State:	   Toward	   Feminist	   Jurispru-­‐
dence	  8	  SIGNS	  635	  (1983).	  	   2.	  	   Associate	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  Director	  of	  Clinical	  Education,	  and	  Co-­‐Director	  of	   the	  Center	  on	  Ap-­‐plied	  Feminism	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Baltimore	  School	  of	  Law.	  	  	   3.	  	   	  See	  LEIGH	  GOODMARK,	  A	  TROUBLED	  MARRIAGE:	  DOMESTIC	  VIOLENCE	  AND	  THE	  LEGAL	  SYSTEM	  10	   (2011).	  Goodmark	  follows	  Abrams	  in	  using	  this	  modifier	  for	  feminist	  analyses	  that	  focus	  explicitly	  on	  describing,	  explaining,	   and	   remedying	  women’s	   sexual	   and	   gender	   subordination.	   See	  Kathryn	   Abrams,	   Sex	  Wars	  
Redux:	  Agency	  and	  Coercion	  in	  Feminist	  Legal	  Theory,	  95	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  304	  n.1	  (1995).	  	   4.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3.	  	  	   5.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  14,	  15.	  Intimate	  partner	  violence	  (“IPV”)	  is	  the	  currently	  popular	  social	  science	  term	  for	  the	  force	  and	  force-­‐threats	  with	  which	  abusive	  partners	  shape	  the	  dynamics	  of	  relationships	  when	  they	  at-­‐tack,	   belittle,	   coerce,	   or	   control	   their	   spouses,	   dates,	   or	   lovers.	   See	   LISA	   D.	   BRUSH,	   POVERTY,	   BATTERED	  WOMEN,	  AND	  WORK	  IN	  U.S.	  PUBLIC	  POLICY	  25	  n.9	  (2011)	  [hereinafter	  BRUSH,	  POVERTY,	  BATTERED	  WOMEN,	  AND	  WORK].	  Domestic	  violence	  apparently	  remains	  the	  common	  term	  in	  legal	  scholarship,	  and	  Goodmark	  uses	  it.	  Except	  when	  invoking	  others’	  writing,	  in	  which	  case	  I	  use	  their	  term(s),	  I	  refer	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  
abuse,	   which	   captures	   the	   combination	   of	   physical	   violence,	   emotional	   cruelty,	   and	   coercive	   control	  characteristic	  of	  abuse	  in	  this	  era	  of	  extensive	  but	  uneven	  women’s	  employment,	  enfranchisement,	  and	  feminist	   organizing.	  See	   EVAN	  STARK,	  COERCIVE	  CONTROL:	  THE	  ENTRAPMENT	  OF	  WOMEN	   IN	  PERSONAL	  LIFE	  5	  (2007).	  Goodmark	  refers	  to	  women	  “subjected	  to	  abuse”	  (rather	  than	  victims,	  survivors,	  or	  battered	  or	  abused	  women),	   a	   turn	   of	   phrase	   attractive	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   refuses	   to	  make	   abuse	   a	  modifier	   of	  women,	  describes	  their	  situation	  aptly,	  and	  avoids	  the	  whole	  “victim/survivor”	  conundrum.	  GOODMARK,	  
supra	  note	  3,	  at	  4.	  The	  passive	  voice	  grammatically	  obscures	  the	  political	  subject	  of	  men’s	  abuse	  of	  wom-­‐en.	  	  	   6.	  	   See	  GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  28.	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en	  subjected	  to	  abuse,	  advocates	  urged	  the	  state	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  polic-­‐ing	  and	  prosecuting	  domestic	  violence,”	  Goodmark	  begins.7	  The	  resulting	   legal	   re-­‐sponse	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  is:	  	   excessively	  focused	  on	  physical	  violence	  rather	  than	  the	  totality	  of	  a	  woman’s	  experience	  of	  abuse,	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  separat-­‐ing	  women	   from	   their	  partners,	   regardless	  of	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  policies	  or	  the	  desires	  of	  individual	  women,	  and	  bound	  to	  ste-­‐reotypes	  of	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse	  that	  take	  power	  from	  indi-­‐vidual	  women	  and	  validate	  intrusions	  on	  women’s	  autonomy.8	  	  Goodmark	  attributes	  the	  defects	  in	  the	  legal	  system’s	  response	  to	  women	  sub-­‐jected	  to	  abuse	  primarily	  to	  the	  malign	  influence	  of	  dominance	  feminism.9	  Based	  on	  that	  attribution,	  she	  proposes	  that	  “[t]he	  time	  has	  come	  to	  reevaluate	  the	  legal	  sys-­‐tem’s	   responsiveness	   to	   the	   complex	   and	   variable	   needs	   of	   women	   subjected	   to	  abuse”	  by	  “shift[ing]	  the	  theoretical	  lens	  through	  which	  domestic	  violence	  law	  and	  policy	   is	   viewed.”10	   Instead	   of	   dominance	   feminism,	   Goodmark	   urges,	   the	   lens	   of	  what	  she	  calls	  anti-­‐essentialist	   feminism	  should	  shape	  the	   legal	  system’s	  response	  to	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse.11	  This	  lens	  should	  moreover	  encourage	  “[t]hose	  who	  want	  to	  eradicate	  .	  .	  .	  abuse”	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  law	  in	  the	  search	  for	  “multiple	  path-­‐ways	  for	  women	  to	  live	  autonomous	  lives	  free	  of	  abuse.”12	  Until	  this	  intersectional	  feminist	  theory,	  which	  privileges	  “the	  experiences	  of	  individual	  [diverse]	  women”13	  instead	   of	   “the	   experiences	   of	   white,	   middle-­‐class,	   heterosexual	   women,”14	   has	   a	  chance	  “to	  permeate	  the	  legal	  structures,	   laws,	  and	  policies	  that	  make	  up	  the	  legal	  response	   to	  domestic	  violence,”15	   the	   relationship	  between	  domestic	  violence	  and	  the	   legal	   system	  will	   be	   the	   titular	   troubled	  marriage.	   Anti-­‐essentialist	   feminism,	  Goodmark	  contends,	  leads	  not	  only	  to	  better	  ways	  to	  understand	  or	  reform	  the	  legal	  system,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  dissolution	  of	  feminists’	  troubled	  and	  troubling	  commitment	  to	  the	  state	  and	  the	  law	  in	  particular	  as	  a	  route	  to	  social	  change.16	  
                                                            	  	  	  	  	   7.	  	   Id.	  at	  1.	  	   8.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  Goodmark	  joins	  many	  others	  in	  this	  indictment	  of	  the	  law-­‐and-­‐order	  response	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  from	  very	  different	  perspectives.	  E.g.,	  LINDA	  G.	  MILLS,	  INSULT	  TO	  INJURY:	  RETHINKING	  OUR	  RESPONSES	  TO	  INTIMATE	  ABUSE	  6	  (2005);	  STARK	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  7-­‐8;	  Kimberlé	  Crenshaw,	  Mapping	  the	  Mar-­‐
gins:	  Intersectionality,	  Identity	  Politics,	  and	  Violence	  against	  Women	  of	  Color,	  43	  STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  1241,	  1243-­‐44	  (1991);	  SHERRY	  HAMBY,	  BATTERED	  WOMEN’S	  PROTECTIVE	  STRATEGIES:	  STRONGER	  THAN	  YOU	  KNOW	  (2013).	  	   9.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  3-­‐4.	   	   10.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  4.	  	   11.	  	   Id.	  at	  4-­‐5.	  	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  197.	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   14.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  5.	  	   15.	  	   Id.	  	   16.	  	   	  Id.	   at	   137-­‐38.	   The	   image	   of	   a	   troubled	  marriage	   in	   Goodmark’s	   title	   is	   ambiguous.	   Sometimes	  Goodmark	   identifies	   the	   trouble	   specifically	   in	   the	   way	   feminist	   activists	   have	   been	   wedded	   to	   legal	  strategies	   for	  countering	  and	  remedying	   the	  harms	  of	  men’s	  violence	  against	  women.	  Other	   times,	  she	  locates	  the	  trouble	  more	  generally	  between	  “domestic	  violence	  and	  the	  legal	  system,”	  as	  in	  the	  subtitle.	  Either	  way,	  Goodmark	  echoes	  the	  language	  but	  not	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  classic	  essay	  by	  economist	  Heidi	  Hartmann.	  Heidi	  Hartmann,	  The	  Unhappy	  Marriage	  of	  Marxism	  and	  Feminism:	  Toward	  a	  More	  Progressive	  
Union,	  3	  CAPITAL	  &	  CLASS	  1	  (1979).	   In	  particular,	  Goodmark’s	  simile	   is	  arguably	  more	   ironic	   than	  Hart-­‐
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Goodmark’s	   synthetic,	   accessible,	   and	   critical	   account	   of	   the	   development,	  current	   condition,	   and	   possible	   futures	   of	   legal	   remedies	   for	  women	   subjected	   to	  abuse	  tracks	  the	  progress	  and	  perils	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  inspired	  feminist	  legal	  ac-­‐tivism.	  Goodmark	  raises	  important	  questions	  about	  feminist	  theory	  and	  legal	  advo-­‐cacy	  while	   engaging	  with	   longstanding	   debates	   about	   strategies	   for	   social	   change	  and	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  terrain	  of	  feminist	  struggle.	  In	  this	  thematic	  review,	  I	  seek	  to	  convey,	  contextualize,	  and	  assess	  Goodmark’s	  argument.	  At	  the	  broadest	  level,	  Goodmark	  is	  weighing	  in	  on	  the	  contested	  issue	  of	  evaluating	  feminist	  activism	  and	  movement	  politics	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	   theory	   in	   feminists’	  projects	  of	  emancipation	  and	  reform.	  I	  read	  Goodmark’s	  contributions	  in	  compari-­‐son	   to	   scholarship	   in	   the	   same	   and	   adjacent	   substantive	   areas.	   First,	   though,	   be-­‐cause	  of	  the	  central	  causal	  role	  Goodmark	  attributes	  to	  feminist	  legal	  theory	  in	  gen-­‐eral	   and	   to	   dominance	   feminism	   in	   particular,	   and	   because	   she	   presents	   an	  important	  alternative	  and	  set	  of	  recommendations	   in	  the	  name	  of	  anti-­‐essentialist	  feminism,	   I	   place	   Goodmark’s	   argument	   in	  A	   Troubled	  Marriage	   in	   the	   context	   of	  debates	  in	  feminist	  state	  theory.	  My	   intention	   is	   to	  highlight	  some	  of	   the	  controversial	  aspects	  of	  Goodmark’s	  portrayal	  of	  feminist	  legal	  theory	  and	  feminist	  theories	  of	  the	  state.	  Her	  assessment	  of	  what	  has	  become	  standard	  operating	  procedure	  in	  the	  legal	  system’s	  response	  to	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse	  is	  consistent	  with	  both	  empirical	  and	  political	  critiques,	  and	  the	  more	  attention	  the	  book	  draws	  to	  the	  need	  for	  change	  in	  practice	  and	  poli-­‐cy,	  the	  better.	  However,	  the	  book	  is	  marred	  for	  the	  theoretically	  informed	  reader	  by	  Goodmark’s	  tendency	  to	  oversimplify	  feminist	  state	  theory	  and	  overstate	  her	  causal	  argument.	  Further	  problems	  arise	  when	  	  Goodmark	  simultaneously	  relies	  on	  a	  Fou-­‐cauldian	  critique	  of	  the	  state	  and	  legal	  power/knowledge,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of-­‐fers	  a	  package	  of	  recommendations	  that	   features	  a	  markedly	  neo-­‐liberal	  combina-­‐tion	   of	   market	   and	   therapeutic	   surveillance	   and	   discipline,	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   I	  attribute	   this	   theoretical	   reductionism	   and	   concomitant	   problems	   to	   Goodmark’s	  laudable	  good	  faith	  effort,	  in	  this	  first	  book,	  to	  make	  it	  comprehensible	  to	  as	  wide	  an	  audience	  as	  possible.	  	  	  “Dominance	   feminists,”	   Goodmark	   writes,	   “led	   by	   law	   professor	   Catharine	  MacKinnon,	   contended	   that	  male	   domination	   of	  women	   in	   the	   sexual	   sphere	  was	  the	  primary	  vehicle	  for	  women’s	  continued	  subordination.”17	  Goodmark	  continues:	  	  	   Domestic	   violence	   law	   and	   policy	   reflects	   the	   influence	   of	   domi-­‐nance	  feminism	  in	  its	  definitions	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  its	  images	  of	  “victims”	  and	  “perpetrators,”	  its	  preference	  for	  separating	  women	  subjected	   to	   abuse	   from	   their	   partners,	   and	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	  role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   righting	   power	   imbalances	   between	   women	  
                                                                                                                                                    mann’s	  because	  Goodmark	  is	  referring	  specifically	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse,	  which	  is	  often	  hidden	  behind	  the	  euphemism	  of	  marital	  trouble.	  	   17.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  2.	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subjected	  to	  abuse	  and	  their	  partners.18	  	  This	  is	  a	  fair	  characterization	  of	  some	  aspects	  of	  a	  radical	  feminist	  analysis	  of	  part-­‐ner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse.	  It	  accurately	  conveys	  the	  importance	  of	  feminists’	  counter-­‐ing	  the	  hegemonic	  understanding	  of	  abuse	  (and	  rape,	  sexual	  harassment,	  and	  wom-­‐en’s	   subordination	  more	  generally)	  as	  private,	  natural,	  divinely	  ordained,	  or	  all	  of	  the	  above,	  and	  therefore	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	   the	  state,	  democratic	  politics,	  or	   the	  long	  arm	  of	  the	  law.	  It	  is	  certainly	  an	  accurate	  characterization	  of	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  law-­‐and-­‐order	  approach	  to	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse	  that	  has	  been	  in	  place	  throughout	   the	  United	  States	  (and	  Canada)	  since	   the	  early	  1990s.19	  Goodmark	  ex-­‐plains	  that	  activists	  and	  advocates,	  guided	  by	  dominance	  feminism	  and	  the	  experi-­‐ence	  of	  battered	  women’s	  movement	  founders	  (in	  this	  case,	  personified	  by	  advocate	  Barbara	  Hart):	  	   articulated	   six	   goals	   for	   intervention	  by	   the	   legal	   system	   in	   cases	  involving	   domestic	   violence.	   Those	   goals	   were	   safety,	   first	   and	  foremost;	  followed	  by	  stopping	  the	  violence;	  holding	  perpetrators	  accountable;	   challenging	   the	   perpetrator’s	   belief	   in	   his	   right	   to	  control	   his	   partner;	   restoration	   of	   women	   subjected	   to	   abuse—economically	  as	  well	  as	   to	  health,	   to	   life	  without	   fear,	   to	  relation-­‐ships	   severed	   by	   the	   perpetrator;	   and	   enhancing	   the	   agency	   of	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse.20	  	  I	  suspect	  Goodmark	  would	  not	  object	  to	  a	  world	  with	  less	  violence,	  more	  ac-­‐countability,	  and	  genuine	  restoration	  and	  enhanced	  agency	  for	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse.	  However,	  Goodmark	  goes	  on	  to	  observe	  the	  mismatch	  between	  the	  goals	  of	  legal	  intervention	  and	  the	  goals	  of	  some	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse	  who	  “might	  not	  rank	   safety	   first	   among	   their	   goals	  .	  .	  .	   [and]	  might	   also	   suggest	   that	   a	   number	   of	  goals	  are	  missing,	  including	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  partner	  de-­‐spite	   the	  abuse	  and	   the	  desire	   to	   co-­‐parent	  with	  an	  abusive	  partner.”21	  From	   that	  mismatch,	  which	  she	  attributes	   to	   the	  essentialism	  of	  dominance	   feminism,	  Good-­‐mark	   condemns	   the	   law-­‐and-­‐order	   approach	   altogether	   and	  with	   it	   the	   feminists	  who	  proposed	  that	  a	  democratic	  state	  ought	   to	  be	  a	  venue	   for	  struggling	  over	   the	  societal	  response	  to	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse.22	  
                                                            	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	  	  	   19.	  	   See	  generally	  Christina	  DeJong	  &	  Amanda	  Burgess-­‐Proctor,	  A	  Summary	  of	  Personal	  Protection	  Or-­‐
der	   Statues	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   12	  VIOLENCE	  AGAINST	  WOMEN	  68	   (2006);	  Ed	  Schollenberg	  &	  Betsy	  Gib-­‐bons,	  Domestic	  Violence	  Protection	  Orders:	  A	  Comparative	  Review,	  10	  CAN.	  J.	  FAM.	  L.	  191	  (1992).	  	   20.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  5-­‐6	  (citing	  Barbara	  J.	  Hart,	  Arrest:	  What’s	  the	  Big	  Deal?,	  3	  WM.	  &	  MARY	  J.	  WOMEN	  &	  L.	  207,	  207-­‐09	  (1997)).	  	   21.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  6.	  See	  also	  MILLS	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  9-­‐10;	  Sally	  F.	  Goldfarb,	  Reconceiving	  
Civil	  Protection	  Orders	   for	  Domestic	  Violence:	  Can	  Law	  Help	  End	   the	  Abuse	  without	  Ending	   the	  Relation-­‐
ship?,	  29	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  1487,	  1489	  (2008);	  HAMBY	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  18-­‐20.	  	   22.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  6-­‐7.	  See	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  Feminism,	  Capitalism,	  and	  the	  Cunning	  of	  History,	  56	  NEW	  LEFT	  REV.	  97	   (2009)	   [hereinafter	  Fraser,	  Feminism]	   (analyzing	   the	   “disturbing	  possibility”	   that	  “the	  cultural	  changes	  jump-­‐started	  by	  the	  second	  wave	  [of	  feminist	  activism,	  including	  some	  of	  the	  key	  principles	  of	  dominance	  feminism],	  salutary	  in	  themselves,	  have	  served	  to	  legitimate	  a	  structural	  trans-­‐
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Goodmark	  makes	  several	  assumptions	  here,	  two	  of	  which	  I	  want	  to	  highlight.	  The	  one	   I	   like	  a	   lot	   is	   the	  assumption	   that	  women	  subjected	   to	  abuse	  are	  diverse,	  may	  want	  the	  abuse	  to	  stop	  without	  wanting	  the	  relationship	  to	  end,	  may	  not	  have	  their	   own	   physical	   safety	   as	   their	   top	   priority,	   and	  may	   not	   trust	   the	   police	   and	  courts	  as	  far	  as	  they	  can	  throw	  a	  grand	  piano.	  Most	  important	  is	  the	  assertion	  that	  diverse	  women	  who	  articulate	  these	  and	  other	  needs	  are	  neither	  deluded	  nor	  trau-­‐matized	   into	   false	   consciousness.23	   I	   agree	  with	  Goodmark	  and	  other	  observers—some	  of	  whom	  have	  been	  more	  sweeping	  than	  Goodmark	  in	  their	  condemnations	  of	  feminist	   analyses	   and	   advocacy	   strategies—that	  when	   researchers	   and	   advocates	  listen	  carefully	  to	  what	  women	  say	  they	  want	  and	  need,	  a	  complex	  and	  varied	  pic-­‐ture	  emerges.24	  Legal	  and	  social	  science	  scholarship,	  policy,	  and	  practice	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines	  will	  be	  greatly	  improved	  by	  incorporating	  these	  insights.25	  The	   more	   questionable	   assumption	   is	   that	   feminists	   managed	   to	   integrate	  their	   analyses	   of	  women’s	   plight	   and	   their	   radically	   transformative	   goals	   into	   the	  law-­‐and-­‐order	  approach	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse.	  Even	  the	  most	  triumphalist	  accounts	   of	   feminist	   legal	   reform	   efforts	   of	   the	   1970s-­‐1990s26	   would	   see	   Hart’s	  goals	  and	  MacKinnon’s	  aspirations—“a	  new	  jurisprudence,	  a	  new	  relation	  between	  life	   and	   law”27—as	   assimilated	   into	   statute,	   policy,	   and	   practice	   in	   only	   the	  most	  fragmentary,	  contested,	  and	  partial	  ways.	  The	  nightmarish	  partisan	  foot-­‐dragging	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2013	  over	  reauthorizing	  the	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  Act28	  illustrates	  the	   fact	   that	  even	  at	   the	  most	   symbolic	   level,	  dominance	   feminism—indeed,	   femi-­‐nism	  of	  any	  variety,	  or	  even	  a	  minimalist	  notion	  of	  bodily	   integrity,	  moral	  autono-­‐my,	  and	  social	  respect	  as	  basic	  conditions	  of	  human	  flourishing29—is	  very	  far	  from	  
                                                                                                                                                    formation	  of	  capitalist	  society	  that	  runs	  directly	  counter	  to	  feminist	  visions	  of	  a	  just	  society.”).	  Id.	  at	  99.	  	   23.	  	   See	   NANCY	   FRASER,	   UNRULY	   PRACTICES:	   POWER,	   DISCOURSE,	   AND	   GENDER	   IN	   CONTEMPORARY	   SOCIAL	  THEORY	   (1989)	   [hereinafter	   FRASER,	   UNRULY	   PRACTICES]	   (analyzing	   the	   struggle	   to	   define	   and	   politicize	  needs	  and	  the	  social,	  political,	  and	  material	  conditions	  required	  to	  meet	  them);	  HERBERT	  MARCUSE,	  ONE-­‐DIMENSIONAL	  MAN	  4	  (1964)	  (distinguishing	  between	  “true”	  and	  “false”	  needs	  in	  support	  of	  his	  claim	  that	  “[t]he	  most	  effective	  and	  enduring	   form	  of	  warfare	  against	   liberation	   is	   the	   implanting	  of	  material	  and	  intellectual	  needs	  that	  perpetuate	  obsolete	  forms	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  existence.”).	  	  	   24.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Tamara	  L.	  Kuennen,	  Analyzing	  the	  Impact	  of	  Coercion	  on	  Domestic	  Violence	  Victims:	  How	  
Much	   is	  Too	  Much?,	   22	  BERKELEY	   J.	  GENDER	  L.	  &	   JUST.	  2,	  7-­‐8	   (2007);	   Jane	  C.	  Murphy,	  Engaging	  with	   the	  
State:	  The	  Growing	  Reliance	  on	  Lawyers	  and	  Judges	  to	  Protect	  Battered	  Women,	  11	  AM.	  U.	  J.	  GENDER	  SOC.	  POL’Y	  &	  L.	  499,	  514	  (2003);	  Emily	  J.	  Sack,	  Battered	  Women	  and	  the	  State:	  The	  Struggle	  for	  the	  Future	  of	  
Domestic	  Violence	  Policy,	  2004	  WIS.	  L.	  REV.	  1657,	  1738	  (2004).	  	   25.	  	   	  See	  generally	  BRUSH,	  POVERTY,	  BATTERED	  WOMEN,	  AND	  WORK	  supra	  note	  5;	  KRISTIN	  BUMILLER,	   IN	  AN	  ABUSIVE	  STATE:	  HOW	  NEOLIBERALISM	  APPROPRIATED	  THE	  FEMINIST	  MOVEMENT	  AGAINST	  SEXUAL	  VIOLENCE	  (2008);	  MILLS	  supra	  note	  8;	  STARK	  supra	  note	  5;	  HAMBY,	  supra	  note	  8.	  	   26.	  	   See	  presentations	  and	  critiques	  in	  ROSE	  CORRIGAN,	  UP	  AGAINST	  A	  WALL:	  RAPE	  REFORM	  AND	  THE	  FAILURE	  OF	  SUCCESS	  (2013);	  STARK,	  supra	  note	  5.	  	   27.	  	   MacKinnon,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  658.	  See	  also	  Fraser,	  Feminism,	  supra	  note	  22,	  at	  105:	  [U]nlike	  some	  of	  their	  countercultural	  comrades,	  most	  feminists	  did	  not	  reject	  state	  institutions	  simpliciter.	  Seeking,	  rather,	  to	  infuse	  the	  latter	  with	  feminist	  values,	  they	  envisioned	  a	  participatory-­‐democratic	  state	  that	  empowered	  its	  citizens.	  Effectively	  re-­‐imagining	  the	  relations	  between	  state	  and	  society,	  they	  sought	  to	  transform	  those	  positioned	  as	  passive	  objects	  of	  welfare	  and	  development	  policy	  into	  active	  subjects,	  empowered	  to	  participate	  in	  democratic	  processes	  of	  need	  interpretation.	  The	  goal,	  accordingly,	   was	   less	   to	   dismantle	   state	   institutions	   than	   to	   transform	   them	   into	  agencies	  that	  would	  promote,	  and	  indeed	  express,	  gender	  justice.	  	   28.	  	   Violence	  Against	  Women	  Reauthorization	  Act	  of	  2013,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  113-­‐4,	  127	  Stat.	  54.	  	   29.	  	   Jane	   E.	   Larson,	   “Imagine	   Her	   Satisfaction”:	   The	   Transformative	   Task	   of	   Feminist	   Tort	   Work,	   33	  WASHBURN	  L.J.	  56,	  56-­‐57	  (1993).	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informing	  the	  law	  or	  legislators’	  approach	  to	  sexual	  and	  other	  violence	  and	  abuse.	  I	  suppose	   that	   this	   is	   an	   empirical	   question,	   and	   reasonable	   people	   could	  disagree.	  But	  even	  optimistic	  advocates	  of	  the	  position	  that	  there	  are	  “woman-­‐friendly”	  states	  filled	  with	   feminist	   bureaucrats	   or	   “femocrats”	  who	  have	  profoundly	   changed	   the	  gendered	   character	   of	   law	   and	   policy30	   would	   question	   Goodmark’s	   assumption	  that	   the	  many	  faults	   in	  the	  goals	  and	  procedures	  of	   the	   legal	  system’s	  response	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  are	  due	  primarily	  to	  too	  much	  of	  the	  wrong	  sort	  of	  femi-­‐nist	  transformation	  of	  the	  law.31	  Having	  made	  these	  assumptions,	  Goodmark	  then	  asserts	   that	  “[t]he	  battered	  women’s	  movement	  has	  ceded	  control	  over	  the	  responses	  to	  domestic	  violence,	  en-­‐abling	   the	   state,	   through	   the	   legal	   system,	   to	   take	   primary	   responsibility	   for	   ad-­‐dressing	   domestic	   violence	   and	   to	   determine	   the	   objectives	   of	   that	   response.”32	  Here,	  Goodmark	  joins	  a	  distinguished	  group	  of	  legal	  scholars	  (such	  as	  Janet	  Halley,	  Angela	  Harris,	  and	  Martha	  Mahoney)	  and	  political	  theorists	  (such	  as	  Wendy	  Brown,	  Kristin	  Bumiller,	  and	  Carol	  Smart)	  in	  critiquing	  feminism	  “for	  its	  portrayal	  of	  wom-­‐en	  as	  victims,	  its	  diminution	  of	  women’s	  agency,	  its	  tendency	  toward	  essentialism,	  and	  its	  reliance	  on	  the	  state	  to	  redress	  women’s	  powerlessness.”33	  This	   last	   point—that	   dominance	   feminism	   relies	   too	   much	   on	   law	   and	   the	  state	  to	  remedy	  the	  harms	  to	  at	  least	  some	  women	  living	  as	  subordinates	  in	  a	  sexist	  hierarchy34—rests	  principally	  on	  French	  post-­‐structuralist	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  argu-­‐ment	  that	  engaging	  with	  the	  law	  inevitably	  generates	  legal	  power/knowledge	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing.35	  This	  critique	  of	  dominance	   feminism,	   in	  gen-­‐eral,	  and	  MacKinnon’s	  state	  theory,	  in	  particular,	  heightens	  rather	  than	  resolves	  the	  paradox	   of	   feminist	   efforts	   to	   change	   gender	   relations	   or	   women’s	   life	   chances	  through	  strategies	  of	   legal	  reform.36	  I	  heartily	  agree	  with	  much	  of	  Goodmark’s	  cri-­‐tique	  of	   the	  numerous	  ways	   that	   law-­‐and-­‐order	   responses	   to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	   (and	   rape)37	   fail	  many	  women.	   I	   am	   also	   friendly	   to	  many	   aspects	   of	   Fou-­‐cault’s	  critique	  of	  the	  legal/penal	  state.38	  However,	  I	  drop	  far	  less	  blame	  for	  this	  un-­‐happy	  state	  of	  affairs	  at	  the	  door	  of	  feminist	  theory	  than	  Goodmark	  does.	  After	  all,	  MacKinnon’s	  essay	  was	  all	  about	  the	  prospect	  of	  rooting	  feminist	  demands	  and	  cri-­‐
                                                            	   30.	  	   DOROTHY	  E.	  MCBRIDE	  &	  AMY	  G.	  MAZUR,	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  STATE	  FEMINISM:	   INNOVATION	   IN	  COMPARATIVE	  RESEARCH	  4-­‐5	  (2010).	  	   31.	  	   See	  id.	  	   32.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  6.	  	   33.	  	   Id.	  at	  12.	  	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  13.	  	  	  	   35.	  	   See	  MICHEL	  FOUCAULT,	  DISCIPLINE	  AND	  PUNISH:	  THE	  BIRTH	  OF	  THE	  PRISON,	  27-­‐28	  (Alan	  Sheridan	  trans.,	  2d	  ed.	  1995)	   [hereinafter	  FOUCAULT,	  DISCIPLINE	  AND	  PUNISH];	  MICHEL	  FOUCAULT,	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  SEXUALITY	  (Robert	  Hurley	  trans.,	  1978)	  [hereinafter	  FOUCAULT,	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  SEXUALITY];	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Two	  Lec-­‐
tures,	  in	  POWER/KNOWLEDGE:	  SELECTED	  INTERVIEWS	  AND	  OTHER	  WRITINGS	  1972-­‐1977,	  at	  78-­‐108	  (Colin	  Gor-­‐don	  ed.,	  1980)	  [hereinafter	  FOUCAULT,	  POWER/KNOWLEDGE].	  For	  examples	  of	  feminist	  appropriations,	  see	  WENDY	   BROWN,	   STATES	   OF	   INJURY:	   POWER	   AND	   FREEDOM	   IN	   LATE	   MODERNITY	   (1995),	   and	   CAROL	   SMART,	  FEMINISM	  AND	  THE	  POWER	  OF	  LAW	  (1989).	  	   36.	  	   MacKinnon,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  643-­‐45.	  	   37.	  	   See	  CORRIGAN,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  17-­‐18.	  	   38.	  	   My	  friendliness	  is	  despite	  Foucault’s	  failure	  to	  consider	  gender	  in	  governance,	  and	  not	  because	  he	  offers	   anything	   resembling	   a	   feminist	   theory	   of	   the	   state.	   See	   LISA	   D.	   BRUSH,	   GENDER	   AND	   GOVERNANCE	  (2003)	  [hereinafter	  BRUSH,	  GENDER	  AND	  GOVERNANCE];	  see	  also	  FRASER,	  UNRULY	  PRACTICES,	  supra	  note	  23.	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tiques	  of	  law	  in	  a	  process	  of	  social	  and	  legal	  transformation	  that	  takes	  seriously	  di-­‐verse	  women’s	  experiences	  and	  perspectives.39	  When	   she	   poses	   anti-­‐essentialist	   feminism	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   dominance	  feminism,	  specifically	  as	  a	  feminist	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  and	  source	  of	  strategic	  deci-­‐sions	  about	  whether,	  when,	  and	  how	  to	  use	   the	   law	   for	  responses	   to	  women	  sub-­‐jected	   to	   abuse,	   Goodmark	   commits	   a	   classic	   syllogism.	   Only	   a	   little	  more	   baldly	  stated,	  the	  argument	  goes	  like	  this:	  	  Dominance	  feminists	  engage	  the	  state.	  Dominance	  feminism	  is	  essentialist.	  Essentialism	  is	  bad.	  Therefore,	  engaging	  the	  state	  is	  bad.40	  	  Essentialism	  (the	  practice	  or	  theory	  of	  positing	  a	  unitary,	  universal,	  ahistorical,	  fem-­‐inine-­‐in-­‐essence	  woman	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  feminist	  activism	  and	  the	  realist	  object	  of	  feminist	  theorizing;41	  “[d]ominance	  feminism’s	  tendency	  to	  assume	  the	  sameness	  of	  all	  women’s	  experiences”)42	  is	  only	  tangentially	  connected	  to	  MacKinnon’s	  willing-­‐ness	   to	   propose	   that	   feminists	   use	   the	   power	   of	   politics	   and	   the	   state	   to	   disrupt	  men’s	   sexual	   subordination	   of	   women	   in	   the	   privacy	   of	   their	   own	   homes.43	   Yes,	  some	  women	  have	  more	  to	  fear	  than	  others	  from	  police	  intervention	  in	  their	  rela-­‐tionships,	  households,	  and	  communities.	  But	  even	  in	  this	  putatively	  anti-­‐essentialist	  era,	  Evan	  Stark	  (to	  invoke	  just	  one	  important	  example)	  defines	  the	  harm	  of	  coercive	  control	  as	  men’s	  ability	  to	  “entrap	  women	  in	  personal	   life.”44	  It	   is	  not	  essentialism	  that	  suggests	  politicizing	  entrapment	  as	  a	   remedy,	  and	  all	   the	  anti-­‐essentialism	   in	  the	  world	  will	  not	  help	  feminists	  theorize	  an	  alternative	  to	  state	  intervention	  or	  dis-­‐solve	  feminists’	  “troubled	  marriage”	  to	  democratic	  processes,	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  law	  as	  the	  terrain	  of	  political	  struggle.	  The	  problems	  feminists	  have	  with	  law	  and	  social	  policy	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	   the	   triumph	   of	   dominance	   feminism.	   Gender—at	   a	  minimum,	   gender	   polariza-­‐tion,	  androcentrism,	  and	  biological	  essentialism45—is	  a	  principle	  of	  organization	  in	  state	   institutions,	   ideologies,	   and	   capacities.46	   State	   actors	   and	   institutions,	   along	  with	   social	   policies,	   perceive,	   produce,	   and	   position	  women	   and	  men	   as	   different	  and	  unequal.47	  Feminist	  state	  theory—a	  gender	  lens	  on	  the	  state,	  if	  you	  will—helps	  make	   the	   gendered	   character	   and	   outcomes	   of	   the	   state	   and	   law	   visible,	   but	   the	  
                                                            	   39.	  	   MacKinnon,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  639-­‐40.	  See	  also	  Fraser,	  Feminism,	  supra	  note	  22	  (observing	  that	  “in	  rejecting	   the	  étatism	  of	   state-­‐organized	   capitalism,	   second-­‐wave	   feminists	  never	  doubted	   the	  need	   for	  strong	  political	  institutions	  capable	  of	  organizing	  economic	  life	  in	  the	  service	  of	  justice.”).	  Id.	  at	  106.	  	   40.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  141-­‐45.	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  at	  136.	  	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  13.	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  10-­‐11,	  13.	  	   44.	  	   See	  generally	  STARK,	  supra	  note	  5.	  	   45.	  	   SANDRA	   LIPSITZ	   BEM,	   THE	   LENSES	   OF	   GENDER:	   TRANSFORMING	   THE	   DEBATE	   ON	   SEXUAL	   INEQUALITY	   4	  (1994).	  	   46.	  	   FRASER,	  UNRULY	  PRACTICES,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  8.	  	   47.	  	   BRUSH,	  GENDER	  AND	  GOVERNANCE,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  16.	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flaws	  of	  the	  legal	  system’s	  response	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  are	  there	  wheth-­‐er	  you	  use	  feminism	  to	  look	  for	  them	  or	  not,	  just	  as	  the	  pattern	  of	  spots	  on	  a	  polar-­‐ized	  windshield	  are	  there	  even	  when	  you	  don’t	  see	  them	  because	  you	  are	  not	  look-­‐ing	   through	   polarized	   sunglasses.48	   Yes,	   some	   of	   the	   mismatches	   between	   the	  available	   legal	   tools—protective	   orders,	   mandatory	   arrest,	   pro-­‐prosecution	   poli-­‐cies49—and	   the	  needs	  of	   large	  groups	  of	  women	   subjected	   to	   abuse	  are	   rooted	   in	  mistaken	   assumptions	   of	   homogeneity	   among	   “battered	   women.”50	   Other	   mis-­‐matches	  are	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  reform,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  legal	  changes	  that	   give	   men	   greater	   access	   to	   the	   women	   they	   have	   abused.51	   Still	   other	   mis-­‐matches	   are	   the	   inevitable	   consequences	   of	   using	   democratic	   politics	   to	  mobilize	  for	  and	  make	  social	  change,	  while	  others	  are	  due	  to	  the	  disturbing	  ways	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	   has	   converged	   with	   feminist	   claims,	   resignified	   feminist	   critiques,	  and	  thwarted	  feminists’	  determination	  to	  transform	  politics	  and	  law.52	  These	  mismatches	  and	  dilemmas	  are	  not	  exclusive	   to	   feminists.	  Critical	   race	  theory	   is	   not	   the	   cause	   of	   grossly	   disproportionate	   incarceration	   rates,	   stop-­‐and-­‐frisk	  policies,	  stand-­‐your-­‐ground	  laws,	  and	  the	  litany	  of	  other	  features	  of	  the	  racial-­‐ized	  surveillance	  and	  incarceration	  state.	  Surely,	  anti-­‐essentialism	  does	  not	  require	  that	  activists	  consign	  the	  state,	  law,	  and	  politics	  as	  a	  terrain	  of	  struggle	  to	  the	  people	  whose	  privileges	  it	  has	  hitherto	  protected	  as	  natural,	  as	  property,	  as	  democracy,	  or	  as	  neutral.	  I	  do	  not	  grant	  Goodmark’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  legal	  response	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  are	  caused	  by	  dominance	  feminism.	  I	  do	  not	  buy	  the	  syllogistic	  logic	  of	  her	  reduction	  of	  feminist	  state	  theory	  to	  essentialism.	  I	  therefore	  question	  Goodmark’s	  reliance	  on	  another	  set	  of	  feminist	  principles	  to	  correct	  those	  problems.	  The	  principles	  and	  agenda	  Goodmark	  articulates	   in	   the	   last	   three	  chap-­‐ters	  of	  A	  Troubled	  Marriage	  have	  considerable	  merits	  as	  antidotes	  to	  the	  corrosive	  obsession	  with	  identifying	  the	  singular	  subject	  of	  feminism	  in	  the	  universal	  catego-­‐ry	  of	  woman.53	  However,	  they	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  feminist	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  or	  law.	  Goodmark	   recommends	  we	   construct	   anti-­‐essentialist	   responses	   to	   domestic	   vio-­‐lence	  by	  avoiding	  essentialism	  (that	  is,	  by	  “[p]lacing	  the	  relationships,	  needs,	  goals,	  desires,	  and	  choices	  of	  individual	  women	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  legal	  response	  to	  do-­‐mestic	  violence”),54	  humanizing	  men	  who	  abuse	  their	  partners,	  maximizing	  options,	  and	  retelling	  narratives	  of	  abuse	  so	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  what	  women	  say	  they	  want	  
                                                            	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  12-­‐13.	  	   49.	  	   BRUSH,	  POVERTY,	  BATTERED	  WOMEN,	  AND	  WORK,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  26.	  	   50.	  	   Because	  of	  problems	   trying	   to	   identify	   the	  epistemological	   and	  ontological	   subject	  of	   feminism,	  whether	  the	  working	  mother	  or	  the	  battered	  woman,	  feminist	  theorists	  have	  been	  induced	  to	  suggest	  a	  more	  political	  process-­‐oriented	  subject,	  such	  as	  women	  in	  collective	  action.	  See,	  e.g.,	  BRUSH,	  GENDER	  AND	  GOVERNANCE,	   supra	   note	   36,	   at	   84-­‐85;	   LINDA	  M.	   G.	   ZERILLI,	   FEMINISM	   AND	   THE	   ABYSS	   OF	   FREEDOM	   167-­‐68	  (2005);	  Lisa	  D.	  Brush,	  Changing	  the	  Subject:	  Gender	  and	  Welfare	  Regime	  Studies,	  9	  SOC.	  POL	  161	  (2002)	  [hereinafter	  Brush,	  Changing	  the	  Subject].	  	   51.	  	   See	  R.	  Amy	  Elman,	  Unprotected	  by	  the	  Swedish	  Welfare	  State	  Revisited:	  Assessing	  a	  Decade	  of	  Re-­‐
forms	  for	  Battered	  Women,	  24	  WOMEN'S	  STUD.	  INT’L	  FORUM	  39,	  49-­‐50	  (2001).	  	   52.	  	   Fraser,	  Feminism,	  supra	  note	  22,	  at	  111.	  	   53.	  	   See	  ZERILLI,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  177-­‐78.	  	   54.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  138.	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and	  need.55	  Goodmark	  counters	  what	  she	  and	  other	  critics	  see	  as	  the	  central	  strate-­‐gic	  failing	  of	  essentialist	  dominance	  feminism—its	  naïve	  willingness	  to	  rely	  on	  state	  intervention	  and	  legal	  reform—with	  a	  call	  for	  feminists	  to	  look	  “beyond	  law”	  to	  cre-­‐ate	   more	   just	   outcomes	   (such	   as	   validation	   and	   vindication	   rather	   than	   criminal	  punishment)	   for	  women	   “unwilling	   to	   invite	   state	   intervention	   into	   their	   lives.”56	  This	  would	  be	  less	  objectionable,	  especially	  in	  the	  name	  of	  specific	  women,	  if	  it	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  entail	  abandoning	  politics.	  Goodmark’s	  proposal	  to	  move	  “beyond	  the	  law”	   seems	   embedded	   in	   the	   fantasy	   that	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	   commissions,	  markets,	  	  and	  community	  accountability	  are	  somehow	  not	  political	  institutions	  and	  processes,	  not	  potentially	  or	   actually	   informed	  by	   law	  and	   the	   state,	   and	  not	  pro-­‐foundly	  gendered.	  Moreover,	  many	  of	  Goodmark’s	  substantive	  proposals	  (the	  use	  of	  microcredit	  to	  foster	  women’s	  entrepreneurship,	  for	  example,	  whether	  packaged	  as	  promoting	   “autonomy”	   or	   “community”)	   merely	   harness	   the	   dream	   of	   women’s	  emancipation	  to	  the	  engine	  of	  capitalist	  accumulation.57	  	  I	  found	  it	  useful	  to	  read	  A	  Troubled	  Marriage	  in	  light	  of	  two	  recent	  books	  that	  till	   closely	   adjacent	   groves	   of	   feminist	   academe	   and	   policy	   concerning	  men’s	   vio-­‐lence	   against	   women:	   Evan	   Stark’s	   Coercive	   Control58	   and	   Rose	   Corrigan’s	   Up	  
Against	  a	  Wall.59	   I	  use	   these	  comparisons	   to	   illustrate	  more	  concretely	   the	  admit-­‐tedly	  abstract	  theoretical	  concerns	  I	  raised	  above.	  Stark	  similarly	  celebrates	  and	  critiques	  the	  reputation	  for	  successful	  feminist	  legal	  reform	  of	  what	  Goodmark	  characterizes	  as	  the	  “spectacularly	  persuasive”	  ar-­‐guments	  of	  dominance	  feminism.60	  Stark’s	  history	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  violence	  ap-­‐proach	  to	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  claims	  that	  “[v]iewing	  woman	  abuse	  through	  the	  prism	  of	   the	   incident-­‐specific	   and	   injury-­‐based	  definition	  of	   violence	  has	   con-­‐cealed	  its	  major	  components,	  dynamics,	  and	  effects,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  nei-­‐ther	  ‘domestic’	  nor	  primarily	  about	  ‘violence.’”61	  Goodmark	   and	   Stark	   agree	   that,	   as	   Stark	   puts	   it,	   “[t]he	   domestic	   violence	  model	   has	   been	   an	   incredible	   success	   by	   conventional	   standards	   of	   intellectual	  productivity,	   funding,	  political	  credibility,	  or	  acceptance	  by	  courts	  and	  the	  general	  
                                                            	   55.	  	   See	  Alesha	  Durfee,	  Victim	  Narratives,	  Legal	  Representation,	  and	  Domestic	  Violence	  Civil	  Protection	  
Orders,	  4	  FEMINIST	  CRIMINOLOGY	  7,	  26-­‐27	  (2009).	  	  The	  potential	   contradictions	  with	   this	   last	  point	   in	  par-­‐ticular	  are	  legion.	  Women	  whose	  narratives	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  legal	  conventions	  (because,	  for	  example,	  they	   lack	   access	   to	   legal	   representation)	   are	   less	   likely	   than	  women	  whose	  narratives	   are	   assimilated	  into	  prosecutors’	  and	  judges’	  understandings	  to	  obtain	  protective	  orders.	  See	  also	  Lorraine	  D.	  Higgins	  &	  Lisa	   D.	   Brush,	  Personal	   Experience	   Narrative	   and	   Public	   Debate:	  Writing	   the	  Wrongs	   of	  Welfare,	   57	   C.	  COMPOSITION	   &	   COMM.	   694,	   719-­‐21	   (2006)	   (noting	   the	   difficulties	   “subordinated	   rhetors”	   face	   in	   com-­‐municating	   about	   their	   experiences	   and	   analyses	   because	   they	   have	   to	   avoid	   both	   the	   rock	   of	   having	  their	  ideas	  ruthlessly	  assimilated	  into	  dominant	  discourses	  and	  the	  hard	  place	  of	  their	  ideas	  being	  illegi-­‐ble	  to	  those	  same	  discourses);	  FRASER,	  UNRULY	  PRACTICES,	  supra	  note	  23.	  	   56.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  178.	  	   57.	  	   Fraser,	   Feminism,	   supra	   note	   22,	   at	   110-­‐111.	   See	   also	   Hester	   Eisenstein,	   A	   Dangerous	   Liaison?	  
Feminism	  and	  Corporate	  Globalization,	  69	  SCIENCE	  AND	  SOCIETY	  487	  (2005).	  	   58.	  	   STARK,	  supra	  note	  5.	  	   59.	  	   CORRIGAN,	  supra	  note	  26.	  	   60.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  3.	  	   61.	  	   STARK,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  10.	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public.”62	   They	   concur,	   in	   addition,	   that	   current	   laws	   and	   criminal-­‐justice	   system	  responses	   to	   domestic	   violence	   “focus	   disproportionately	   on	   physical	   abuse,”	   are	  rooted	   in	   racialized	   “[s]tereotypes	  of	  women	  subjected	   to	  abuse	  as	  passive,	  weak,	  and	  powerless	  .	  .	  .	   in	  need	  of	  salvation,”	  uniformly	  expect	  that	  women	  should	  sepa-­‐rate	  from	  their	  partners,	  and	  “take	  power	  from	  individual	  women	  and	  validate	   in-­‐trusions	  on	  women’s	  autonomy.”63	  Stark	  and	  Goodmark	  reiterate	  long-­‐standing	  cri-­‐tiques	  of	  the	  police	  state	  and	  its	  intrusions	  into	  the	  lives,	  families,	  and	  communities	  of	   women	   subjected	   to	   abuse,	   especially	   of	   the	   women	  most	   vulnerable	   to	   puni-­‐tive64	  state	  intervention:	  women	  of	  color,	  poor	  women,	  single	  mothers,	  welfare	  re-­‐cipients,	  and	  immigrants.65	  In	  contrast	  to	  Goodmark’s	  blaming	  dominance	  feminism	  for	  this	  sad	  state	  of	  affairs,	  however,	  Stark	  blames	  the	  ways	  the	  law-­‐and-­‐order	  state	  appropriated	  and	  co-­‐opted	  feminist	  critiques	  of	  partner-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  of	  wom-­‐en.66	  He	  proposes	  re-­‐conceptualizing	  the	  harm,	  crime,	  and	  legal	  system’s	  response	  to	   what	   he	   calls	   coercive	   control,	   replacing	   misdemeanor-­‐level	   physical	   violence	  with	   liberty	  harms.67	  Stark’s	  approach	   is	   thus	   less	  epistemologically	   idealist	   in	  his	  assessment	  of	  what	  went	  wrong	  and	   less	  politically	   sanguine	   about	   theory	   as	   the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  “how	  men	  entrap	  women	  in	  personal	   life”68	  than	  Good-­‐mark’s.	  In	  her	  work	  in	  the	  closely	  adjacent	  field	  of	  rape	  reform,	  Rose	  Corrigan	  docu-­‐ments	  and	  explains	  very	  similar	  processes	  of	   feminist	  demands	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  
                                                            	   62.	  	   Id.	  at	  11.	  	  	   63.	  	   GOODMARK,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  3,	  4.	  	   64.	  	   Part	  of	  MacKinnon’s	   feminist	  critique	  of	   the	  gendered	  character	  of	   the	  state	  and	   law	  centers	  on	  the	   inadequacies	  of	  both	   liberal	  and	  Marxist	   theories	  and	  politics	   to	  propose	  state	  actions	  and	   institu-­‐tional	  arrangements	  that	  might	  be	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  women	  as	  a	  group	  sharing	  certain	  concrete	  condi-­‐tions,	  including	  systematic	  vulnerability	  to	  gendered	  violence.	  In	  her	  view:	  [l]iberal	  strategies	  entrust	  women	  to	  the	  state.	  Left	  theory	  abandons	  us	  to	  the	  rap-­‐ists	  and	  batterers.	  The	  question	  for	   feminism	  is	  not	  only	  whether	  there	   is	  a	  mean-­‐ingful	   difference	   between	   the	   two,	   but	  whether	   either	   is	   adequate	   to	   the	   feminist	  critique	  of	  rape	  and	  battery	  as	  systemic	  and	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  law	  with-­‐in	  that	  system.	  MacKinnon,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  643.	  In	  the	  current	  political	  climate,	  thirty	  years	  on,	  MacKinnon’s	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  state	  perhaps	  seems	  quaintly	  optimistic,	  but	  not	  grossly	  misguided.	  Now,	  the	  work-­‐fare/prison	  state	  extends	  paternalist	  protectionism	  to	  no	  one.	  The	  liberal	  political	  imagination	  and	  will	  supporting	  public	  investment	  in	  health,	  welfare,	  education,	  and	  democratic	  participation	  are	  trumped	  by	  the	   punitive	   and	   disciplinary	   dynamics	   of	   the	   state:	   surveillance	   and	   incarceration,	   workfare,	   pitiless	  rules	  of	  property	  generating	  debt	  and	  foreclosure,	  and	  compulsory	  compliance	  with	  the	  “work	  hard	  and	  play	  by	  the	  rules”	  ethic	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  central	  to	  neo-­‐liberalism.	  This	   is	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Fou-­‐cauldian	   critique	   of	   the	   disciplinary	   state	   with	   which	   I	   wholeheartedly	   agree.	   See	   LOÏC	   WACQUANT,	  PUNISHING	   THE	  POOR:	  THE	  NEOLIBERAL	  GOVERNMENT	  OF	   SOCIAL	   INSECURITY	  1-­‐3	   (2009);	   JAYE	  CEE	  WHITEHEAD,	  THE	  NUPTIAL	  DEAL:	  SAME-­‐SEX	  MARRIAGE	  AND	  NEO-­‐LIBERAL	  GOVERNANCE	  6-­‐7	  (2011);	  Fraser,	  Feminism,	  supra	  note	  22.	  	  	   65.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Ruth	  A.	  Brandwein,	  Family	  Violence	  and	  Welfare	  Use:	  Report	  From	  the	  Field,	  in	  BATTERED	  WOMEN,	  CHILDREN,	  AND	  WELFARE	  REFORM:	  THE	  TIES	  THAT	  BIND	  45-­‐58	  (Ruth	  Brandwein	  ed.,	  1999)	  (pointing	  out	   that	   the	   “worthy”	  battered	  woman	  and	   the	  stigmatized	  “welfare	  cheat”	  are	  often	   the	  same	  person,	  and	  many	  of	  these	  categories	  of	  identity	  obviously	  intersect	  in	  the	  identities	  and	  social	  locations	  of	  many	  women—a	  basic	  point	  of	   anti-­‐essentialism);	   JILL	  A.	  MCCORKEL,	  BREAKING	  WOMEN:	  GENDER,	  RACE,	   AND	  THE	  NEW	  POLITICS	   OF	   IMPRISONMENT	  15-­‐18	   (2013);	  BETH	  E.	  RICHIE,	   ARRESTED	   JUSTICE:	  BLACK	  WOMEN,	  VIOLENCE,	  AND	   AMERICA’S	   PRISON	   NATION	   19-­‐22	   (2012);	   ROBERTA	   VILLALÓN,	   VIOLENCE	   AGAINST	   LATINA	   IMMIGRANTS:	  CITIZENSHIP,	  INEQUALITY,	  AND	  COMMUNITY	  12-­‐15	  (2010).	  	  	   66.	  	   See	  STARK,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  6-­‐8.	  
	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  380-­‐82.	  	  	   68.	  	   See	  generally	  STARK,	  supra	  note	  5.	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legal	  and	  medical	  system’s	  responses	  to	  rape.	  Corrigan	  observes	  that:	  	   Early	  anti-­‐rape	  activists	   framed	  a	  vision	  of	   legal	   reform	  based	  on	  rewriting	  criminal	  law,	  not	  asserting	  broad	  claims	  about	  a	  right	  to	  be	  free	  of	  violence	  or	  fear,	  or	  to	  equality.	  The	  anti-­‐rape	  movement	  thus	   has	   no	   experience	   transforming	   its	   ideas	   about	   freedom	   or	  autonomy	   or	   bodily	   integrity	   into	   legally	   cognizable	   rights	  claims.69	  	  Corrigan	  documents	  the	  institutional	  dynamics	  of	  law-­‐and-­‐order	  politics	  and	  medi-­‐cal	   expertise	   when	   feminist	   social	   movements	   are	   in	   abeyance,	   and	   attributes	   a	  considerable	  portion	  of	   the	   “failure	  of	   success”	   in	   rape	   reform	   to	   these	  phenome-­‐na.70	  She	  allocates	  another	  share	  of	  the	  blame	  to	  the	  ways	  feminist	  legal	  advocates	  moved	  on	  from	  legislative	  victories	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  a	  rights-­‐based	  strategy	  for	  changing	  the	   legal	  and	  medical	  responses	  to	  rape.71	  Rape	  crisis	  center	  administra-­‐tors	  and	  staff	  were	  left	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves	  in	  a	  partially	  transformed	  legal	  con-­‐text	  and	   in	  settings—hospitals,	   courts,	   state-­‐funded	  social	   service	  organizations—where	   they	  were	  often	  without	  material	   resources,	   credible	   expertise,	   or	  political	  leverage	   and	   thus	   unable	   to	   realize	   their	  modest	   immediate	   goals,	   let	   alone	   their	  transformative	   ambitions.72	   Corrigan	   concludes	   that,	   “if	   feminist	   ‘movements’	   are	  made	  up	  of	  women	  figuring	  out	  and	  telling	  each	  other	  what	  they	  think	  makes	  sense,	  rape	  care	  advocates	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  told	  each	  other	  that	  feminist	  thinking	  about	  rape	  doesn’t	  really	  work	  or	  make	  sense.”73	  This	  sounds	  remarkably	  like	  what	  Goodmark	  observes	  about	  the	  troubled	  marriage	  between	  dominance	  feminism	  and	  the	  legal	  system.	  However,	  Corrigan’s	  evidence	  leads	  her	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  prob-­‐lem	   is	   less	  with	   feminism	  or	   feminist	   theory	  per	   se	   and	  more	  with	   “the	  ways	   that	  feminism	   has	   been	   re-­‐shaped—and	   often	   abandoned—in	   part	   as	   a	   result	   of	   en-­‐gagement	  with	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions.”74	  Stark,	  Corrigan,	  and	  Goodmark	  share	   the	  best	  aspects	  of	   feminist	   theorizing.	  All	   engage	   in	   stimulating	   efforts	   to	   (re)think	   aspects	   of	  what	   is	   in	  ways	   that	   pro-­‐voke,	  propose,	  and	  perhaps	  prefigure	  and	  even	  prepare	  the	  way	  for	  what	  might	  be.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  although	  they	  differ	  in	  their	  particulars	  (and	  perhaps	  in	  epistemo-­‐logical	  assumptions,	  but	  this	  remains	  a	  vexed	  issue),	  dominance	  feminism	  and	  anti-­‐essentialist	   feminism	   are	   both	   utopian	   in	   the	   non-­‐pejorative	   sense.75	   By	   non-­‐pejorative	  utopianism,	  I	  mean	  that,	  applied	  to	  the	  question	  of	  social	  (including	  legal	  system)	  responses	  to	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse,	  both	  theories	  provoke	  readers	  by	  mapping	  the	  contours	  of	  present	   inadequacies	  and	  calling	  them	  unjust.	  Both	  theo-­‐
                                                            	   69.	  	   CORRIGAN,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  202.	  	   70.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	  	  	   72.	  	   See	   id.	  at	   16-­‐17;	   see	   also	   PATRICIA	   YANCEY	  MARTIN,	   RAPE	  WORK:	   VICTIMS,	   GENDER,	   AND	  EMOTIONS	   IN	  ORGANIZATION	  AND	  COMMUNITY	  CONTEXT	  224	  (2005).	  	   73.	  	   CORRIGAN,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  251.	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  See	  also	  Fraser,	  Feminism,	  supra	  note	  22.	  	   75.	  	   See	  KATHI	  WEEKS,	  THE	  PROBLEM	  WITH	  WORK:	  FEMINISM,	  MARXISM,	  ANTIWORK	  POLITICS,	  AND	  POSTWORK	  IMAGINARIES	  208	  (2011)	  (theorizing	  utopianism	  as	  provocation,	  proposal,	  and	  pre-­‐figurative	  practice).	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ries	  propose	  taking	  seriously	  women’s	  claims	  to	  being	  harmed	  by	  abuse,	  and	  both	  direct	  attention	  to	  the	  diverse	  remedies	  women	  generate	  from	  the	  vantage	  points	  of	  their	  particular	  experiences.	   In	  addition,	  both	   theories	  generate	  specific	  visions	  of	  alternate	  practices	  that	  might	  prefigure	  life	  in	  a	  world	  with	  more	  justice	  and	  oppor-­‐tunities	  for	  determining	  their	   life	  directions	  for	  women	  subjected	  to	  abuse.	  This	  is	  the	  best	  sort	  of	  political	  imagination	  we	  can	  ask	  of	  feminist	  theory,76	  and	  I	  am	  grate-­‐ful	  for	  Goodmark’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  re-­‐seeing	  possibilities	  and	  mak-­‐ing	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place	  for	  diverse	  women	  to	  live	  our	  lives.	  	  
                                                            	   76.	  	   See	  ZERILLI,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  152-­‐56.	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